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The paper provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of fiscal decentralization 
within Russian regions in 1994–2001. The conventional view that more decentralized 
governments are found in regions/countries with higher income, higher ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, and higher levels of democracy is not supported by the data. This motivates a 
more refined analysis of the determinants of decentralization that points to the link between 
decentralization and the structure of regional government revenue: access to windfall revenues 
leads to a more centralized governance structure. The degree of decentralization also depends 
positively on the level of urbanization and regional size and negatively on income and general 
regional development indicators such as the education level.  
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What Determines the Extent of Fiscal Decentralization? The Russian Paradox 
I. Introduction 
Why are some countries highly decentralized while others are not? And in particular, what 
determines the degree of fiscal decentralization, i.e., the decentralization of government 
spending? The benefits and perils of decentralization have been actively studied both 
theoretically and empirically; however, few studies have attempted to construct and empirically 
test the positive theory of fiscal decentralization. A general consensus that emerged from several 
cross-country empirical studies (most notably Oates, 1972, Pommerehne, 1977, and Panizza, 
1999) pointed toward four main determinants of fiscal decentralization: larger size, higher income 
per capita, higher ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and higher level of democracy. 
Large federations (such as the United States, Brazil, India or Russia) provide a valuable 
opportunity to analyze the determinants of fiscal decentralization at the regional level
4. Such 
analysis is in many ways similar to a cross-country analysis since regions in large federations are 
often as large as independent states; they enjoy sufficiently high fiscal autonomy and arguably are 
under the influence of the same decentralization drivers as independent states.  
This paper tests the hypotheses about the determinants of fiscal decentralization using 
data on regions in Russia from the 1990s to the early 2000s. Russian regions constitute an 
interesting sample for studying the determinants of decentralization for four main reasons. Firstly, 
cross-country studies of the determinants of decentralization inevitably run into difficulties when 
trying to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, the choice of a specific sample of 
countries often influences the results and data are not necessarily consistent across countries since 
the methods and standards of data collection vary. In the case of Russia, though present, 
unobserved heterogeneity is arguably less of a problem, the sample choice is well defined and the 
data are collected and reported using the same methods and standards. Secondly, Russian regions 
                                                 
4 Fiscal decentralization at the regional level is conventionally measured by the ratio of municipal government 
expenditure to general regional government expenditure. 2 
retain sufficient sovereignty in their decentralization choices – that is, they have broad powers to 
decide on the allocation of budget funds between municipal governments and the (central) 
government of each region, “regional government” hereafter (see Freinkman et al., 1999). 
Thirdly, for the sample of Russian regions all variables of interest have remarkably high 
variation, comparable to that in a cross-country sample. For instance, the ratio of the minimum to 
maximum per capita gross regional product [GRP] exceeds 30 times (see Table 1). Population, 
land area, and ethnic heterogeneity also vary considerably across regions. At the same time, 
democratic traditions appear to be more uniform due to the 500 years of common history of a 
highly centralized state. 
Finally, studying decentralization in Russian regions has one more specific advantage 
related to the short history of Russian decentralization. As Panizza (1999) noted, although the 
equilibrium degree of decentralization could be a function of several variables (income, size, etc., 
as predicted by the models), the actual observable degree of decentralization is also a product of 
historical circumstances, and it exhibits high inertia. As a result, the main factors determining the 
observed differences in the degree of decentralization could be intrinsically unobserved and 
immeasurable. However, in the case of Russia, such effects of path dependency and unobserved 
factors are much less of an issue. This is because the observed degree of decentralization in 
Russian regions is de facto an outcome not of a long evolutionary development, but of the explicit 
choice made by regional authorities in response to a simultaneous structural shock associated 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union. That shock demolished the existing highly centralized 
structure of governance and enabled regional authorities to tailor their governance structures in 
line with their local preferences during the extended period of weak central government that has 
followed.  
Apart from the seminal works of Oates (1972) and Panizza (1999) mentioned above, a 
number of other empirical studies looked at the determinants of fiscal decentralization. Wallis 3 
and Oates (1988) found for the sample of the US states that only population and urbanization 
variables robustly positively affected the degree of fiscal decentralization at the state level. 
Patsouratis (1990) studied fiscal decentralization in a sample of 11 EU countries and reported 
robust positive effects of population size and per capita income variables. Inter-American 
Development Bank (1997) looked at fiscal decentralization in a small sample of Latin American 
countries and found that larger country size, larger population, formally federal structure, and 
better development of democratic institutions were conducive to fiscal decentralization. Arzaghi 
and Henderson (2005) studied the determinants of fiscal decentralization in 41 countries (looking 
only at government consumption as opposed to total government expenditure) and found that 
fiscal decentralization was associated with higher per capita income, smaller size of the main 
metropolitan area, formally federal structure, and higher levels of democracy. For a more detailed 
review of the empirical literature, see Cerniglia (2003) and Letelier (2005).  
Freinkman and Yossifov (1999) first studied the determinants of fiscal decentralization in 
Russian regions and found for the period of 1994-96 that historically more developed regions and 
regions with lower inflation tended to be more decentralized. This paper extends the analysis of 
Freinkman and Yossifov (1999) to cover an expanded time interval and, more importantly, to 
check a much more developed set of decentralization hypotheses. At the same time, the paper 
intends to apply to Russia the framework developed by Wallis and Oates (1988) for the analysis 
of decentralization in the United States. 
Our initial statistical analysis revealed that the conventional hypothesis about the 
determinants of fiscal decentralization fails with the Russian regional data. Two coefficients in 
our base model (income and ethnolinguistic fractionalization) are significant but of the strictly 
opposite signs relative to the priors. Another core variable (democratization) remains statistically 
insignificant. Only urbanization and regional size variables have the hypothesized signs and are 
statistically significant in most specifications. This finding encouraged further analysis that points 4 
to the importance of the structure of regional budget revenues -- government revenues coming 
from the mineral resource sector and from federal transfers (i.e., “windfall” revenues) tend to be 
much less shared with municipal governments than more conventional regional revenues. Thus, 
the degree of regional fiscal decentralization is decreasing in the share of “windfall” revenues in 
regional budgets. These results also shed some light on the origins of the flypaper effect 
supporting the hypothesis that it can be explained by general behavioral principles as suggested 
by Hines and Thaler (1995). Lower decentralization was also found to be associated with a higher 
proportion of university students in the regional population and unfavorable attitude of regional 
governments to reforms in general. When controlling for these additional factors, ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization loses its explanatory power, but regional size, urbanization and income variables 
retain their significance and sign. That is, higher regional income is still associated with less 
decentralization of regional fiscal systems. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II presents a brief overview of the conventional 
theory of the determinants of decentralization and tests it on the Russian data. Section III 
discusses and tests the alternative hypotheses about the determinants of decentralization. Section 
IV concludes. 
II. The Russian Paradox 
  2.1. The determinants of decentralization. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 
constituted a major decentralization shock: the share of subnational government in general 
government expenditure increased from about 15 percent in the late 1980s to over 50 percent in 
the mid 1990s (Freinkman and Haney, 1997). Moreover, against the general background of 
downsizing of the general government in Russia, consolidated subnational budget expenditure 
increased in absolute terms: municipal and regional government expenditure grew by 3.1 percent 
of GDP and 2.4 percent of GDP respectively over 1992-97, while the federal budget contracted 
by 21.6 percent of GDP over the same period. Faced with such rapid decentralization, different 5 
regions adopted very different models of splitting the expenditure between municipal and 
regional government levels.  
What could explain these differences given similar starting points for all regions? The 
following five factors are commonly believed to affect the choice of the extent of fiscal 
decentralization. 
1. Size. According to Oates (1972), local governments can have both consumer and 
producer advantages over the central government. Consumer advantage is due to the fact that 
local provision of public goods and services can better match the diverse preferences of the local 
population. The producer advantage is due to asymmetric information: local governments can 
collect more precise information about the cost and benefits of local projects and thus provide 
public goods in a more cost-efficient way. Since the benefits from matching heterogeneous 
preferences are more significant when the regional population/area is large and diverse, the 
degree of decentralization is expected to increase with the size of the country (region)
5. 
2. Ethnic fractionalization. For the same reason the degree of decentralization is also 
expected to increase in relation to ethnic fractionalization. 
3. Level of democracy. The argument that more democratic states tend to be more 
decentralized rests on the plausible assumption that the degree of fiscal decentralization is 
eventually decided by the central authorities since taxation tends to be substantially more 
centralized than expenditure in all countries and in particular in Russia, and legislative powers 
also rest with the central authorities. With developed democratic institutions central authorities 
accept a higher degree of fiscal decentralization since they care more about better matching 
preferences of voters through local decision making.
6 
 
                                                 
5 Previous studies generally confirmed this hypothesis with the exception of Stegarescu (2004) who reports negative 
impact of population on fiscal decentralization in a sample of 32 OECD countries. However this may be simply 
caused by omission of fixed time effects in panel fixed effects estimation. 
6 Panizza (1999) incorporates this argument into his model of the choice of the degree of decentralization. 6 
4. Income. The subtlest argument refers to the role of per capita income. Following 
Wheare (1964), decentralization is often viewed as a luxury good since, as Prud’homme (1995) 
argues, at low levels of income the basic needs of the population are universal and require no fine 
preference matching, while as income grows people start demanding different kinds of public 
goods. Oates (1972) and Panizza (1999) indeed find evidence of a positive correlation between 
per capita income and fiscal decentralization. Wallis and Oates (1988) on the contrary find no 
such evidence for the USA states and argue that the relationship can be reversed in rich countries: 
as societies become richer, they pay more attention to equalization of wealth, which is usually 
implemented by fiscal redistribution through central government transfers. Combining the two 
arguments and viewing Russia as a medium-income country, one would expect a positive 
relationship between income and fiscal decentralization in Russian regions.  
5.  Urbanization. Wallis and Oates (1988) found that urbanization is associated with 
higher fiscal decentralization. As the size of municipalities grows, they become able to provide a 
wider range of public goods and services, which could not be provided within small rural 
communities. The study by the Inter-American Development Bank (1997) finds that among 
categories of government expenditure the most decentralized are urban transportation, water 
supply, waste and urban street management. In the course of urbanization the weight of these 
expenditure items in total government spending grows rapidly, facilitating overall fiscal 
decentralization. World Bank (2000) report suggests that decentralization may be viewed as a 
means of maintaining political stability when pressures for more autonomy become stronger. 
Insofar as educated middle class emerging in cities becomes more exposed to global aspirations 
and voices demand for more autonomy, urbanization may contribute to decentralization. Besides, 7 
  urbanization can affect the degree of decentralization in the long run indirectly, via its 
contribution to income growth and democratization.
7  
Finally, several studies (Inter-American Development Bank, 1997, Cerniglia, 2003, 
Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005) confirmed that a formal federal structure contributes to higher 
fiscal decentralization; however such constitutional considerations do not apply to the analysis at 
the regional level. 
2.2. Fiscal decentralization in Russian regions. Russia is a federal state, in which the 
governments of 89 regions have broad powers with respect to their fiscal policies, particularly the 
level and structure of budget spending. Regional governments are free to decide on such 
important elements of expenditure policies as the levels of salaries of civil servants in sectors 
financed from subnational budgets, subsidies to state-owned enterprises and to households, or the 
level of social benefits.  
The organization of regional fiscal systems and in particular the assignment of 
expenditure responsibilities to municipal and regional governments, until very recently was 
largely determined by regional governments themselves. There was little federal regulation on 
this issue and regions had the opportunity to develop different decentralization models. 
Moreover, in the 1990s, the Russian central government was quite weak and regional elites had 
de facto even more freedom of decision making than a broad federalist legal framework would 
suggest. Most importantly, regional governments were empowered to make frequent changes to 
the “rules of the game” (Freinkman et al., 1999).  
Starting from 2000 much effort has been made by Putin’s administration to strengthen 
central government control over the regions and a number of laws regulating subnational finance 
came into force, aimed at improving uniformity in subnational fiscal arrangements (see Institute 
                                                 
7 In spite of the strong theoretical support for the urbanization hypothesis, unlike the first four determinants of fiscal 
decentralization, its analysis is ignored by many empirical studies. Also, Letelier (2005) reports a negative effect of 
urbanization in a sample of 64 countries. 8 
for the Economy in Transition (2004) for more details). Therefore, the period before 2001 is 
particularly well suited for the study of the determinants of decentralization. 
2.3. Testing strategy. The 5 hypotheses can now be tested for Russian regions. The 
dependent variable, the degree of fiscal decentralization [DEC], can be measured either as a share 
of municipal government expenditure in general (consolidated) regional government expenditure 
or as a share of municipal government revenue in general regional government revenue. The 
former is preferred since the justification of most hypotheses is based on arguments about 
spending rather than revenue generation.
8 Figure 1 shows the trend for the average degree of 
fiscal decentralization within Russian regions over the period. 
The size of a region [SIZE] can be measured either in terms of population or in terms of 
area. The former approach relates better to the matching heterogeneous preferences argument. 
However, the latter measure is also commonly used in the literature and relates directly to the 
notion of inter-jurisdictional spillovers. One of the obvious costs of decentralized decision 
making is the potential failure to internalize positive and negative effects of policies in one region 
on the welfare of the inhabitants of the neighboring regions. Arguably, the extent of such 
potential spillovers declines as distances become larger and therefore the costs of decentralization 
due to unaccounted spillovers will be lower in larger states. 
                                                 
8 Using expenditure also ensures better comparability of findings with those of previous studies. While some authors 
look at both expenditure and revenue measures, others, for instance, Inter-American Development Bank (1997) and 
Arzaghi and Henderson (2005), examine expenditure only. Also, as Wallis and Oates (1988) point out, the measures 
of expenditure decentralization tend to be more stable over time compared to measures of revenue decentralization. 9 
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Income can be measured using per capita GRP in real terms
9.  An alternative (purchasing 
power parity [PPP] adjusted) measure of income takes into account the fact that the purchasing 
power of the Russian rouble differs greatly across regions. These differences are reflected in 
highly varying figures of the regional subsistence minimum, a minimum monthly per capita 
income required to survive (according to the Russian Statistical Agency, see Table 1). Since the 
bundle of goods underlying the calculation of the subsistence minima is the same across regions, 
by dividing per capita GRP by the subsistence minimum one obtains a PPP adjusted measure of 
per capita income (expressed as a multiple of the annual subsistence minimum). Both indicators 
are used to check the robustness of the results. 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization [ELF] is measured using the conventional ELF index, a 
number between 0 and 1 showing the probability that two randomly selected individuals belong 
to different ethnolinguistic groups. Higher values of the index correspond to higher population 
heterogeneity. The ELF index was used by Mauro (1995) and by many subsequent cross-country 
                                                 
9 Converted to 2000 prices using region-specific consumer price indices since regional specific GRP deflators are 
unavailable. 10 
studies of growth, and also by Panizza (1999).
10 For Russian regions this measure has not been 
readily available and was constructed using the data from the 1989 census.
11  
Urbanization [URBAN] is conventionally measured by the percentage of the urban 
population. 
The most challenging task is to construct a region-specific measure of democracy [DEM]. 
Most cross-country studies (including Panizza, 1999) use the Gastil (1990) index of democracy 
and political rights or similar survey-based indices. Unfortunately such indices are unavailable for 
Russian regions. Instead, two proxies for the regional level of democracy are considered. 
The first proxy is based on electoral statistics and equals the spread between the 
percentage of votes for the winner and for the runner-up in the first round of the elections of 
regional executive.
12 Certainly, tense electoral competition is neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition for developed democracy; however, on average one would expect a high positive 
correlation between the competitiveness of elections and the quality of democratic institutions. 
For the sample of 38 presidential democracies the correlation between the percentage of votes 
that the head of state got in the first round of the last elections prior to 2000 and the Gastil index 
of democracy in 2000 is 0.53.
13 
The second proxy is based on the only currently available survey-based study of the 
institutional environment in Russian regions carried out by an independent international 
organization, namely the corruption perception index compiled by Transparency International for 
40 Russian regions in 2001-02. Once again, the perception of corruption and the perception of 
                                                 
10 Earlier studies (e.g., Oates, 1972) distinguished between heterogeneous and homogeneous states by using a 
dummy variable. 
11 Ethnic fractionalization may have plausibly increased during the 1990s as a result of significant external migration 
and various shocks. However, we did not have access to the data from the latest (2002) Russian census. 
12 Electoral rules vary across regions. In some regions a simple majority is not sufficient for victory and unless one 
candidate gets more than 50 percent of votes a second round of elections is called between the two candidates who 
obtained most votes in the first round. Hence, only the first round spreads are comparable across regions. 
13 Authors’ calculations based on the World Bank Database of Political Indicators. Higher values of Gastil Index 
correspond to lower levels of democracy and political freedom. Unfortunately the data on the runner-up votes are not 
readily available for a broad sample of countries, leaving the above comparison approximate. 11 
political freedom are not perfectly correlated, but the correlation is expected to be highly positive. 
For the sample of 89 countries for which data are available for 2000, the correlation between the 
negative of the corruption perception index and the Gastil index is 0.66.
14 
The fact that the correlation between the Gastil index and the two available proxies, albeit 
strong, is far from being perfect should not be viewed as disappointing since the Gastil index 
itself is an imperfect discrete measure of the underlying concept of democracy. 
The equation to be estimated is thus: 
DECit = α + βGRPit + γELFi + δDEMit + λSIZEit + μURBANit + εit    (1) 
Since this study focuses on the long-term determinants of the degree of fiscal 
decentralization rather than on explaining short-term deviations from the mean, equation (1) is 
estimated by applying the between panel estimator that exploits the cross-sectional variation of 
the time averages for each region.
15  
2.4. Data. To test the five hypotheses, we assembled a new dataset on Russian regions. 
The data cover the period 1994-2001 and 86 Russian regions (the cities of Moscow and St. 
Petersburg are excluded as incomparable with the rest of the regions for the purpose of the 
analysis; and Chechnya is excluded due to data unavailability).
16 The data are taken mostly from 
official Russian statistical yearbooks and the Ministry of Finance database and augmented from 
other sources listed in Appendix 1. The data for certain years and regions are unavailable, for  
                                                 
14 Higher values of the corruption perception index compiled by Transparency International correspond to lower 
corruption and hence the negative of the index is taken. 
15 See Wooldridge (2002) for details. 
16 The data before 1994 are unreliable due to hyperinflation and poor coverage (e.g., GRPs were not computed). The 
period after 2001 appears to be characterized by much stronger centralization, particularly in the political sense, so 
that the degree of fiscal decentralization within a region can no longer be thought of as chosen almost entirely at the 
discretion of regional authorities. 12 
instance GRP was not computed for autonomous districts before 2000 (with the exception of 
Chukotka). 
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest.
17  
2.5. Basic results. The results obtained by estimating equation (1) using the between 
panel estimator are reported in Table 2.
18 Specifications A and C use the PPP adjusted measure of 
GRP whereas specification B checks the robustness of results using the unadjusted real GRP. In 
addition, the specification C includes the corruption based measure of democracy instead of the 
competitiveness of regional elections. Since data on these indicators are occasionally missing 
regressions A-C also differ in subsamples used.  
                                                 
17 Note that unlike the standard corruption perception index, the corruption perception index values for Russian 
regions are increasing in the perceived degree of corruption and are explicitly normalized so that the least corrupt 
region is characterized by value 0 and the most corrupt region is characterized by unity. 100 percent votes spread 
means that the governor has always been appointed and never elected by a popular vote. 
18 Estimation has been carried out using STATA 8.0. 13 
 
Table 1.  Descriptive statistics for selected variables  
Variable Mean 
Standard 





Average degree of expenditure 
decentralization, 1995-2001  0.65 0.13 0.68 0.09 0.83  20  85 
Per capita GRP in 2001, 1,000 current 
RUR  52,922 65,068 34,620 10,799 400,405  123  86 
Monthly subsistence minimum in 
2001, current RUR  1,714  596  1,496  1,212  4,167  35  83 
Per capita GRP in 2001, multiples of 
annual subsistence minimum  2.36  2.12  1.90  0.51  13.6  90  83 
Index of ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, 1989  0.33  0.2  0.29  0.05  0.85  61  86 
Average spread between the votes for 
the winner and the runner up in the 1st 
round of elections, percentage points 
(1994-2001) 44.3  21.7  42  1.8  100  49  85 
Corruption perception index, 2001  0.59  0.21  0.63  0  1  36  37 
Area, 1,000 km
2 239  464  77  8  3,103  194  86 
Population in 2001, 1,000 people  1,552  1,273  1,252  18  6,436  82  86 
Excess budget revenue (net  federal 
transfers as share of GRP) in 2001  -0.02  0.13  -0.04  -0.71  0.51  650  83 
Average share of fuel industry in 
industrial production, %  13.4  21.3  5.6  0  94.6  159  85 
Share of privatized companies in 
retail trade and services as of July 1, 
1996, %  77.5  18.7  83.7  20.3  100  24  75 
Gini coefficient for personal incomes 
in 2001  0.4 0.04 0.4 0.34 0.51  10  83 
Social transfers (excluding pensions) 
as % of incomes in 1995  3.82  1.37  3.56  2.41  11.48  36  76 
Gini coefficient for municipal 
government per capita own revenue in 
2001 0.34  0.16  0.29  0.17  0.9  47  71 
Infant mortality in 1995, per 1,000 
children born  19 3.9  18.3  12  34  21 83 
Urbanization in 1995  66.3  15.6  67.8  0  92.4  24  83 
Number of students per 10,000 
population in 1995  133 66 136 0  343  50  83 
Labor force with university degree in 
2001, %  20.3  3.9  20.1  12.2  32.5  19  83 
Spending on infrastructure and 
development as % of regional budget 
in 1998  10.3 6.7 7.7 3.1  40.0  65  81 
Spending on infrastructure and 
development as % of regional budget 
in 2001  20.0 8.7 17.7 4.6  45.2  44  83 
Source: See Appendix 1. 14 
Regardless of the specification and subsample, three variables are always statistically 
significant at (at least) the 10 percent level. Firstly, as predicted, the degree of fiscal 
decentralization increases with the size of the region, although only the effect of the population is 
always statistically significant.
19 However, the signs of the other two significant variables 
contradict the conventional theory: the degree of fiscal decentralization is decreasing in both real 
per capita GRP and in the index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. All effects are sizable. For 
instance, a one standard deviation increase in the index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization ceteris 
paribus induces a 3.5 percentage point decrease in the degree of fiscal decentralization. 
At the same time, as predicted, more urbanized regions tend to be more fiscally 
decentralized (although statistical significance of the urbanization variable is lost in the small 
subsample). Measures of democracy are not statistically significant although the observed signs 
of the coefficients are mutually consistent: negative coefficients on the perceived corruption and 
the election votes spread both imply a positive relationship between democracy and 
decentralization. The economic size of the implied effect is also relatively low: a change from an 
appointment system to the maximum electoral competitiveness with a tie in the first round 
induces further fiscal decentralization equal to only 4 percent of the total government 
expenditure. 
The use of the corruption perception index in model C provides a good robustness check 
for the results since the subsample where data on corruption perception are available is random as 
far as fiscal decentralization is concerned. The results are generally consistent across subsamples 
and specifications. Using the non-adjusted for PPP income measure in model B brings no 
significant changes either. 
                                                 
19 This is consistent with the finding of Freinkman and Yossifov (1999) that area is not a robust determinant of fiscal 
decentralization in Russian regions. 15 
 
Table 2. Testing 5 hypotheses 
Model A  B  C 
Estimation Method  between panel estimator 
Dependent variable  degree of decentralization 
 real GRP per capita  -0.111     -0.272 
log, PPP adjusted  (0.028)***     (0.064)*** 
real GRP per capita     -0.096    
Log     (0.027)***    
Population 0.044  0.023  0.070 
Log (0.012)***  (0.013)*  (0.028)** 
Area 0.007  0.021  -0.002 
Log (0.010)  (0.011)*  (0.015) 
Ethnolinguistic -0.174  -0.163  -0.259 
fractionalization (0.067)**  (0.066)**  (0.107)** 
Election votes spread in   -0.00040  -0.00043    
1st round   (0.0005)  (0.0005)    
Corruption        -0.016 
         (0.076) 
Urbanization 0.0019  0.0024  0.0014 
   (0.0010)*  (0.0011)**  (0.0018) 
Constant 0.340  1.315  0.367 
   (0.099)***  (0.255)  (0.226) 
number of observations  546  619  259 
number of groups (regions)  85  85  37 
R
2 between 0.44  0.43  0.62 
Notes 
1. Standard errors in parentheses. Values significant at 10% level are marked with *, at 
5% with **, at 1% with ***. 
  
III. Resolving the Russian Paradox 
3.1. Income and decentralization. The results of the previous section are in sharp 
contrast with the general consensus about the determinants of decentralization. In particular, with 
the work of Panizza (1999) who finds that fiscal decentralization is robustly associated with 
higher per capita incomes, higher ethnolinguistic fractionalization and higher levels of 
democracy. How can this “Russian paradox” be resolved or explained? Could it be driven by 
misspecification of the equation (1)? Or is the conventional theory not accurate indeed?  
One must first explain the negative association between the measure of fiscal 
decentralization and per capita income. There can be several explanations for this unexpected 
relationship. Firstly, as already mentioned, a lower degree of fiscal decentralization in a region 16 
may be a result of higher local needs for redistributive policies. One would expect regions that do 
more fiscal redistribution (e.g., regions with a higher share of social transfers in personal income) 
to have more centralized governments. Whether regions with higher income have more 
redistributive policies is unclear. In our sample, the pair wise correlation (reported in Table 3 
below) suggests the opposite, but in a cross-country context the relationship between income and 
the extent of fiscal redistribution is likely to be positive.  
To test the role of the redistribution factor, four additional variables were considered: the 
share of social transfers in the average personal income in 1995 (i.e., at the start of the period
20), 
Gini coefficient for personal incomes measuring income inequality in the region, Gini coefficient 
for municipal government per capita own revenue measuring horizontal fiscal imbalances in the 
region, and the share of the population of working age. Since the regional government may be 
concerned with equalizing both municipal government revenues and personal incomes, our 
additional variables reflect income inequality at individual and municipal levels. Both Gini 
coefficients are available only for 2001, whereas the measure of social transfers is taken as of 
1995 to minimize possible reverse causality from fiscal decentralization in the late 1990s to the 
extent of income redistribution in the region (this reduces the sample to 76 regions since 1995 
data for autonomous districts are unavailable). Finally, the demand for redistribution policies is 
likely to be higher in regions with a higher share of children and elderly people in the population 
since children and the elderly consume a disproportionately large share of social benefits. 
Secondly, it is interesting to test Prud’homme’s (1995) argument that the demand for 
decentralization becomes pronounced only when the basic needs of population are satisfied, i.e., 
at higher stages of development.
21 Per capita income is generally rather a noisy reflection of the 
achieved standard of living and the quality of public goods and services. This is especially true 
                                                 
20 1994 was dropped due to data unavailability. Pensions are not included in social transfers since their share in 
regional income is determined mostly by demographics.  
21 Analyzing fiscal decentralization in Russian regions Freinkman and Yossifov (1999) report evidence that can be 
interpreted as supporting this hypothesis. 17 
for Russia as an economy in transition with a high share of incomes generated in the shadow 
sector, which leads to additional distortions in regional income statistics. An alternative measure 
of the achieved development level is the infant mortality rate, which also has significant variation 
across Russian regions and is positively correlated with income. We use both the 1990 figures 
that reflect the level of initial pre-transition development of each region and the concurrent infant 
mortality. Alternatively, the indicator of urban landline phone connections is employed (the 
number of landline phones per 1,000 urban populations). Another important indicator of 
development achievements is the level of education. We measured it in two ways: using the 
number of students per 10,000 populations (variable students) and the share of the labor force 
with university degrees (variable education). 
Thirdly, the structure of regional fiscal revenue may matter. It is well known that in 
intergovernmental relations money tends to stick where it hits, leading to a so-called “flypaper 
effect”. Namely, the elasticity of regional government expenditure with respect to regional 
income is consistently estimated to be a small fraction of the elasticity of regional government 
expenditure with respect to central government transfers (the estimates of the latter range from 
0.5 to more than unity).
22 This generally suggests that governments spend “earned” and 
“unearned” (or “windfall”) revenue in different ways.
23  
This would suggest that “earned” revenue could be decentralized in some “normal” way, 
while windfall revenue is likely to be shared differently, with a much larger share retained by the 
regional government. In the Russian context one can identify two main sources of windfall 
regional government revenues: transfers received from the federal government and budget 
revenue derived from availability of local rents, primarily through implicit and explicit taxation 
of highly profitable local firms in extraction industries such as oil and gas. The former source 
                                                 
22 See the survey by Hines and Thaler (1995) and the study by Knight (2002). 
23 Numerous studies (e.g., Blanchard et al., 1994) found the same was true for corporate entities. 18 
 constitutes a major part of government revenue in the poorer regions while the latter is more 
common in the richer regions. 
Measuring the windfall component of transfers in the context of Russian regions is not 
straightforward. Considering all central government transfers as windfall revenue would 
considerably overestimate the windfall, since in many cases the “earned” revenue is first 
transferred to the federal budget and then routinely finds its way back to the region in the form of 
federal transfers. Transfers can be viewed as genuinely “unearned” only in the case when they 
result in total regional government expenditure exceeding the total tax collection in the region. 
Thus, the difference between general regional government expenditure and total tax collection 
(expressed as a share of GRP) could be considered as a summary measure of regional transfer 
dependency or in other words, of regional availability of “excess budget revenues”. The excess 
revenue measure is expected to affect the degree of decentralization negatively. 
The most important mineral resources in Russia are oil and gas. Therefore, following 
Desai et al. (2003), the extent to which a regional government has access to rent-related windfall 
revenue is proxied by the share of fuel industry in the total industrial output in the region. Once 
again, the constructed measure is expected to be negatively associated with the degree of 
decentralization. Given the fact that oil and gas extracting regions tend to be significantly richer 
on average, the hypothized centralization of windfall revenue may explain the observed negative 
relationship between income and decentralization. 
Finally, even after controlling for redistributive policies, the initial level of regional 
development, and windfall revenues, per capita GRP may still affect the degree of 
decentralization. If this negative effect persists, it may provide an indirect evidence of an 
increasing propensity of governments to finance larger scale development projects at higher 
levels of income, since such projects tend to be financed and implemented in a centralized way by 
regional governments.  19 
3.2. Ethnic fractionalization and decentralization. What about the unexpected negative 
association between ethnolinguistic fractionalization and decentralization? Arzaghi and 
Henderson (2005), who obtain a similar negative relationship in a cross-country study, explain it 
by the explicit choice of ethnically diverse countries to preserve a high degree of fiscal 
centralization in order to minimize the risk of secession (in line with the argument of Easterly and 
Levine, 1997, and La Porta et al., 1998). However, the secession movement of municipalities 
within regions, even if not totally unconceivable, is arguably much more limited compared with 
secession threats by regions in large federations, whereas in our sample the negative relationship 
between ethnolinguistic fractionalization and decentralization still appears to be very strong.  
An alternative explanation of this phenomenon is based on different attitudes of regions to 
reforms. In Russia, the most ethnolinguistically fractionalized regions are ethnic republics that 
during the 1990s enjoyed significantly higher decision-making autonomy compared to other 
(administrative) types of regions. At the same time (and partly as a consequence of the granted 
autonomy), the ethnic republics pursued reforms much slower on average. As “slow reformers” 
they inherited a centralized approach to governance compared to more keen reformers. 20 
 






















































































































































































































































































fiscal decentralization  1.00                                           
log p.c. real GRP  -0.24  1 . 0 0                     
log p.c. real GRP, PPP  -0.22 0.86 1 . 0 0                     
log population  0.08 0.48 0.18  1 . 0 0                   
log area  -0.07 0.40 0.65  0.08 1 . 0 0                   
election votes spread  -0.23 -0.04 -0.10 0.01 -0.14 1 . 0 0                 
fractionalization  -0.43 -0.19 -0.09  -0.29  0.03 0.21  1 . 0 0                
fuel industry share  -0.48 0.35 0.32  0.13 0.29  0.15 0.39 1 . 0 0               
excess budget revenue  -0.06 -0.27 -0.02  -0.41  0.08 0.09  0.30 -0.18  1 . 0 0               
privatization rate   0.36 0.10 0.08  0.13 0.03  -0.21  -0.62  -0.21  -0.31 1.00             
share of social 
transfers  0.15  -0.51  -0.50  -0.35 0.09  0.08 0.52 0.14 0.21  -0.32 1.00           
child mortality  0.02  -0.13 0.05  -0.37 0.28  0.01 0.16 0.14 0.37 0.01 0.17 1.00         
corruption   0.27  -0.35   -0.34   0.00   -0.25   0.12   -0.07   -0.40    -0.06  0.41   -0.3  0.25  1.00      
urbanization  -0.11  0.64  0.55 0.36 -0.01 -0.12 -0.39 -0.03 -0.15  0.23 -0.63 -0.26 -0.17  1.00    
number of students  -0.52 0.13 0.19  0.34  -0.36  0.16 0.01  -0.09  -0.26 0.09  -0.14  -0.24 0.05  0.22  1.00 
Notes: Based on 1999 unless otherwise indicated in the text 
 
A suitable measure showing how keen regions were on pursuing reforms is the share of 
privatized enterprises in retail trade and services as of July 1, 1996, i.e., approximately 4 years 
after the launch of mass privatization. It is a suitable measure because regions did not have a 
choice of whether or not to participate in the privatization program, but they retained significant 
discretion over the pace of the privatization process. As a result, the 1996 privatization outcome 
varied greatly across regions with the share of privatized companies covering the range from 20 
percent to 100 percent (see Table 1). As expected, the index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization is 
highly negatively correlated with the privatization measure of reforms (the coefficient is -0.62, 
see Table 3). If this “attitude to reforms” explanation is valid, the privatization variable will be  21 
positively associated with the degree of regional decentralization and ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization will lose its explanatory power in the expanded model. 
The earlier study by Freinkman and Yossifov (1999) found indirect evidence in support of 
a similar hypothesis. Namely, fiscal decentralization in Russian regions was negatively associated 
with inflation in 1994-96. Freinkman and Yossifov argue that inflation in 1994-96 was higher in 
those regions where it was lower in 1992-93, i.e., in the regions that initially delayed price 
liberalization and generally were more reluctant to pursue reforms. Arguably, privatization 
completion provides a more precise measure of the speed of reforms and hence offers a more 
direct test of this hypothesis. 
Panizza (1999) also emphasized the importance of history dependence for the choice of 
the degree of decentralization and found empirical support for it. However, the test of Panizza 
and the one in this paper are fundamentally different: Panizza showed that the speed of the 
change in the degree of decentralization positively depends on the remaining distance between 
the actual fiscal decentralization and its equilibrium value predicted on the basis of the four main 
explanatory variables. Inclusion of the privatization variable in this paper, on the contrary, shows 
that the choice of fiscal decentralization at any point in time may be dependent on other policy 
choices not incorporated into standard decentralization models. 
An alternative explanation of the importance of ethnolinguistic fractionalization rests on 
the advantageous position of ethnic republics in revenue sharing with the federal government. 
Treisman (1996) argues that due to a threat of secession, ethnic republics systematically enjoyed 
higher federal transfers. Indeed the correlation between “excess” budget revenue and 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization is positive and sizable (0.3), therefore it is important to control 
for windfall revenues when testing for the effect of being a “slow reformer”, as well as for the 
effect of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. The dummy variable for ethnic republics should also be 
included.    22 
  Other control variables include the population of the largest city as a share of total 
population (used by Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) as an alternative proxy for urbanization) and 
the logarithm of the distance between the regional capital and Moscow (to capture possible 
geographical patterns in fiscal decentralization). Neither variable proved to be significant. 
3.3. Results. Equation (1) was augmented with variables introduced above. Table 3 shows 
that although some of the selected variables could be expected to be highly correlated (e.g., GRP 
and infant mortality or urbanization and the population share of the largest city), in fact they are 
not; and hence there are no serious objections to using them as regressors simultaneously. The 
results are presented in Table 4. As in Table 1, column A reports the results for our preferred 
specification, while columns B and C check the robustness of the results by introducing additional 
control variables (which automatically restrict the available sample).  
The hypothesis about the negative impact of windfall revenues on fiscal decentralization 
is strongly supported. The negative coefficient on the share of the fuel industry is robustly 
statistically significant in all specifications. It is also economically significant: a 10 percent 
increase in the share of the fuel industry is associated with 2.2 percent higher fiscal centralization. 
Excess regional government revenue generated by transfers also has the expected negative sign 
and is statistically significant in most cases.  23 
 
Table 4. Resolving the Russian Paradox  
Model A  B  C 
Estimation Method  between panel estimator 
Dependent variable  degree of decentralization 
Real GRP per capita  -0.192     -0.166 
log, PPP adjusted  (0.043)***     (0.054)*** 
Real GRP per capita     -0.215    
log     (0.062)***    
Fuel industry share  -0.0022  -0.0020  -0.0026 
   (0.0008)**  (0.0011)*  (0.0009)*** 
Excess budget transfer revenue  -0.662  -0.118  -0.639 
   (0.242)***  (0.276)  (0.256)** 
Social transfers  0.018  0.006  0.020 
as share of income in 1995  (0.013)  (0.018)  (0.014) 
Infant mortality  0.008     0.0057 
   (0.004)**     (0.0040) 
Infant mortality in 1990     -0.00007    
      (0.00065)    
Gini coefficient      0.189  -0.007 
(population in 2001)     (0.410)  (0.363) 
Gini coefficient      0.083    
(municipalities in 2001)     (0.085)    
Ethno-linguistic -0.021  0.043  -0.063 
fractionalization (0.081)  (0.148)  (0.135) 
Privatization rate in 1996  0.0009  0.0019  0.0009 
   (0.0007)  (0.0010)*  (0.0008) 
Ethnic republic dummy     -0.036  0.005 
      (0.057)  (0.047) 
Area 0.017  0.033  0.014 
log (0.010)*  (0.017)*  (0.014) 
Population 0.045  0.007  0.044 
log (0.015)***  (0.025)  (0.025)* 
Urbanization 0.0031  0.0057  0.0036 
   (0.0011)**  (0.0019)***  (0.0017)** 
Population share     -0.032  0.040 
of the largest city     (0.143)  (0.137) 
Votes spread in 1st round of elections  0.00020  -0.00004  0.00013 
   (0.00043)  (0.00055)  (0.00045) 
Students   -0.00024    -0.00031 
   (0.00013)*    (0.00021) 
Education   -0.0048   
   (0.0034)   
Share of population        -0.428 
of working age       (0.511) 
Distance from Moscow,        0.019 
log        (0.015) 
constant 0.001  2.124  0.127 
   (0.172)  (0.540)  (0.377) 
number of observations  450  374  449 
number of groups (regions)  76  63  76 
R
2 between 0.58  0.57  0.60 
Standard errors in parentheses. Values significant at 10% level are marked with *, at 5% with **, at 1% with 
***. 24 
The hypothesis that stronger redistributive policies are associated with a more centralized 
government is not supported, with none of the four variables used to test this claim being 
statistically significant. That being said, it should be noted that the insignificance of the Gini 
coefficients can be a result of two opposite effects canceling each other out. On the one hand, 
higher income inequality calls for more intensive redistribution and hence promotes fiscal 
centralization; on the other hand, as Wallis and Oates (1988) point out, higher Gini coefficients 
may reflect higher spatial heterogeneity of preferences due to income segregation thus calling for 
higher fiscal decentralization. 
Even when infant mortality is statistically significant, the positive sign of the coefficient is 
inconsistent with the hypothesis that more developed regions should be more decentralized. The 
coefficients on the education variables also show that more developed regions tend to be more 
centralized: the effects of both the number of higher education students and the share of the labor 
force with university degrees on fiscal decentralization are always negative, the former being 
statistically significant in some specifications. Furthermore, the negative pairwise correlation 
coefficient between fiscal decentralization and the number of students per capita is greater than 
0.5 in absolute terms.  
When controlling for all these factors, the negative coefficient on per capita GRP itself 
retains remarkably high statistical significance, which is consistent with the hypothesis that 
higher per capita GRP is associated with more centralization rather than more decentralization. It 
could be explained by an increased propensity to finance large scale development projects at 
higher levels of income.  
A positive coefficient on the privatization variable suggests that more keen reformers 
tended to have more decentralized governments (although statistical significance of this result 25 
varies, the coefficient always has the expected sign and is of similar magnitude).
24 When 
controlling for the windfall revenues and the attitude to reforms, the index of ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization is never statistically significant and randomly switches signs in different 
specifications, suggesting that in our sample ethnolinguistic fractionalization as such has no 
direct impact on fiscal decentralization. 
As in basic regressions, larger regions in terms of population tend to have more 
decentralized governments, although when controlling for a large number of other factors, either 
area  or population are always statistically significant, but on their own they lose statistical 
significance in some specifications. At the same time, the measures of democracy are never 
significant determinants of the degree of decentralization, nor are other control variables such as 
the relative size of the largest metropolitan area or the ethnic republic dummy. 
Finally, we checked for possible non-linearities in the relationship between 
decentralization and per capita income.
25 It may be the case that poorer regions tend to 
decentralize as income increases while richer regions recentralize as income grows further (or the 
other way round), in which case the overall negative linear relationship could do a poor job of 
capturing the non-linear dependence. The sample was split into subsamples of regions with PPP 
adjusted per capita income below the median (in 1995) and above the median. The coefficients on 
per capita income in the two subsamples proved to be almost identical (-0.171 and -0.153) and 
highly statistically significant in both cases, so that no evidence of non-linearity has been found.
26 
3.4. Income and decentralization revisited. If the negative impact of income and 
socioeconomic development on fiscal decentralization could indeed be explained by an increased 
                                                 
24 Several alternative reform indicators were tested (share of housing/utilities costs paid by population as of 2001; 
ratio of subsidies in agriculture to agricultural output in 1995; share of commodities with regulated prices in retail 
turnover in 1996; index of price regulation in 1996; index of investment potential in 1997 compiled by the Expert 
weekly magazine). None of these were statistically significant. 
25 Reflecting the considerable changes that took place in Russia’s fiscal policies after the 1998 financial crisis, we 
also checked if there are any noticeable differences in the results if we look at the data that cover only the latest years 
of the period, e.g., 2000-01. We found that the results for such a greatly reduced sample generally hold. 
26 Alternative ways of splitting the sample were used with a similar effect.  26 
propensity to finance large scale development projects at higher levels of income and 
development, one would expect to find wealthier and more advanced regions to invest a higher 
share of their government revenue in infrastructure and development.  
To identify the part of regional government spending earmarked for infrastructure and 
development projects and to distinguish it from routine expenditure that does not finance major 
projects and development goals is a challenging task. Certainly there may be different views on 
what expenditure items should be labeled as infrastructure and development and any such 
measure will be intrinsically subjective. Our preferred measure of spending on infrastructure 
aggregated the following expenditure lines of Russian standard budget classification: 
development of market infrastructure, non-mandated expenditure on education (i.e., spending 
other than on basic primary, secondary and higher education), roads, transport, 
telecommunications, information technologies, ecology, construction works, and architecture. 
Table 1 indicates that this variable ranging from 3 to 45 percent of regional government spending 
has significant cross-regional variation.  
Table 5 presents the results of the between panel regression showing what factors 
determined the average share of spending on development projects in regional government 
expenditure in 1998-2001. Consistent with our hypothesis, a higher level of spending is observed 
in wealthier regions (as proxied by PPP adjusted per capita income) and in more developed 
regions (as proxied by higher levels of education and lower infant mortality). On the contrary, 
other important determinants of the degree of fiscal decentralization (such as windfall revenues, 
privatization rate in 1996 or urbanization) do not seem to have affected spending on development 
objectives in any significant way. Among other controls that we used, the ethnic republic dummy 
proved to be statistically significant: ethnic republics spent on average 2.9 percent more on 
infrastructure and development, other things being equal. Therefore the results in Table 5 indicate 
that more developed and richer regions were indeed characterized by a higher propensity to spend 27 
on major publicly financed development projects that called for higher centralization of 
government expenditure.  
Table 5. Income and fiscal decentralization 
Estimation method  Between panel estimator 
Dependent variable 
Development spending  to regional 
government expenditure ratio 
GRP per capita  0.074 
Log, PPP adjusted  (0.018)*** 
Fuel industry share  -0.000006 
   (0.00036) 
Education 0.0021 
   (0.0013)* 
Infant mortality  -0.0028 
   (0.0015)* 
Privatization rate in 1996  -0.00008 
   (0.00031) 
Urbanization 0.0007 
   (0.0005) 
Ethnic republic dummy  0.029 
   (0.014)** 
constant 0.056 
   (0.057) 
Number of regions (groups)  76 
Number of observations  376 
R
2 between  0.44 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Values significant at 10% level are 
marked with *, at 5% with **, at 1% with ***.  
 
Unfortunately, given the short time series dimension of the data it is impossible to 
ascertain whether this phenomenon is permanent or of a transitional nature. The latter may be the 
case since after the break-up of the Soviet Union Russian regional governments inherited a 
disproportionately large public sector including public housing and networks of health, education, 
culture and sport institutions. Following the considerable income declines in the early transition, 
these assets became unaffordable in most cases at the new real revenue level of the 1990s. 
However, regional governments were downsizing the inherited infrastructure slowly and often 
unwillingly. As a result, most regional government spending went on maintenance and operation 
of the existing social facilities and housing subsidization, while investment and spending on basic 
infrastructure and development in general remained low. Consequently, only the wealthiest 28 
regions could afford any significant public investment, centralizing the projects because of the 
perceived severe shortage of investment funding. Therefore the observed negative dependence 
between income and fiscal decentralization may to a large extent be a transitional phenomenon, 
whereby preference for centralization simply reflects the imbalance between large public sector 
assets and low government revenue, which distorts public expenditure, depresses government 
investment, and predetermines higher fiscal centralization at higher levels of income and 
economic development. Indeed, infrastructure and development spending was gradually picking 
up: the mean share of regional government spending allocated to development objectives 
increased from 10.3 percent in 1998 to 20 percent in 2001. This increase was widespread and not 
confined to particular regions since the median also increased from 7.7 percent to 17.7 percent 
over the same period (see Table 1). 
Alternatively, this pattern could result from competition for capital between regions with 
highly unequal investment potentials, as described by Cai and Treisman (2005). The richer 
regions actively invest in infrastructure and development in order to attract mobile factors (capital 
and labor) while poorer regions that are intrinsically unattractive for investors cannot attract much 
capital whatever their efforts, and hence they choose not to invest in infrastructure. However up 
to date there is little systematic empirical evidence of such behavior.  
Certainly the analysis in this subsection is rather crude and rests on the assumption that 
spending on regional infrastructure and development does not feed back into regional income in 
the short run (i.e., income and development indicators can be treated as exogenous). But overall 
the results indicate rather convincingly that the propensity to finance large scale development 
projects implemented at the regional level was increasing in income and level of development. 
However, unfortunately given the data constraints it is not possible to disentangle the permanent 
and potentially transitional components of this phenomenon. 29 
3.5. Long-term versus short-term determinants of fiscal decentralization. All the 
determinants of fiscal decentralization could be classified into the long term (e.g., urbanization, 
size, level of development, ethnic fractionalization) and the short term ones (attitude to reforms, 
competitiveness of elections, availability of central government transfers and windfall revenues, 
etc.). It takes decades for the former factors to change considerably, while the latter can be altered 
if not overnight than at least within a year. 
The analysis shed some light on the relative importance of the short-term and long-term 
determinants of fiscal decentralization. Of unambiguously long-term factors, three are important 
determinants of fiscal decentralization: urbanization, size, and higher education traditions 
(arguably the number of higher education students per capita shows high inertia). However, short-
term factors appear to be equally important, in particular, windfall revenues (both in the form of 
natural resource rents and intergovernmental transfers), attitude to reforms and per capita income. 
(We consider per capita GRP as a short-term factor because it was contrasted with the long-term 
indicators of development, such as infant mortality and education.) Out of the 55 percent of cross-
sectional variation in fiscal decentralization explained by the model, roughly half (30 percent) is 
explained by long-term factors alone. 
Therefore, although the degree of fiscal decentralization is to a large extent determined by 
long-term developments, it can be substantially influenced in the short run by changing the rules 
of sharing “windfall” revenues, enhancing economic growth, electing or appointing more reform-
prone officials, and other measures.  
The analysis also suggests that the standard empirical model of decentralization with 4-5 
explanatory variables (size, income, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, democracy, and 
occasionally urbanization and federal status) is likely to be misspecified and suffer from the 
omitted variables bias. All of the above variables (probably with the exception of income) 
measure the long-term determinants of fiscal decentralization ignoring the short-term ones. 30 
3.6. Convergence. A related question is that of how fast regions adjust the extent of fiscal 
decentralization in response to changes in factors that proved to be important determinants 
thereof. In other words, do Russian regions converge to the long-run “equilibrium” level of 
decentralization and what is the pattern of such convergence? Answering this question would 
require much longer time series than are currently available, but some insights can be obtained 
from running a dynamic panel regression on the available data.  
Convergence to the equilibrium level of decentralization would imply that the extent of 
fiscal decentralization in a given year depends to a large extent on the historical value inherited 
from the previous year but also on the current income, windfall revenue, population, urbanization, 
and level of economic development (other important determinants of fiscal decentralization such 
as area or measures of attitude to reforms do not have time series variation and therefore do not 
enter the convergence equation): 
DECit = αi + νDECit-1 + βGRPit + γWINDFALLit + δDEMit + λSIZEit + μURBANit + πCONTROLSit + ft + εit  (2) 
where αi are fixed regional effects and ft are fixed time effects (the full set of year dummies). 
Specification (2) allows controlling for any time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity among the 
regions as well as for common shocks such as changes in legislation, financial crises, etc. The 
latter effects are absorbed by the fixed time effects ft.  
Estimation of equation (2) by fixed effects results in a bias of order 1/T (where T is the 
time dimension of the panel, Nickell, 1981). This problem can be circumvented by applying the 
Arellano-Bond generalized method of moments estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The 
Arellano-Bond procedure estimates equation (2) in first differences (so that regional fixed effects 
are cancelled out) using the lagged differences of the dependent variable of order 2 and higher as 
instruments.  31 
 
Table 6. Analyzing convergence 
Estimation Method  Arellano-Bond 
Dependent variable  fiscal decentralization 
Lagged   0.275 
decentralization (0.121)** 
 Real GRP per capita  0.015 
log, PPP adjusted  (0.029) 
Excess budget transfer   -0.201 
revenue   (0.207) 
Urbanization 0.006 
   (0.005) 
Population -0.079 
log (0.134) 
Infant mortality  -0.003 
   (0.003) 
Students -0.00003 
   (0.00021) 
Election year  -0.006 
 (0.011) 
Constant 0.018 
   (0.013) 
Time effects  yes 
N observations (groups)  461 (81) 
test of 2 order autocor: z 
(p-value) -0.48  (0.63) 
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Values significant at 10% level are marked with *, at 
5% -- with **, at 1% -- with ***. 
 
The results are presented in Table 6.
27 The estimation reveals that fiscal decentralization 
does not seem to adjust instantaneously to changes in any factors. Namely, one cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the extent of fiscal decentralization does not adjust to changes in population, 
urbanization, transfers, income, and development indicators within one year. Convergence to a 
(new) equilibrium in response to changes in these variables is a lengthy process. 
Certainly this result may be partly driven by the generalized method of moments 
estimation performed on a relatively small sample and thus producing large standard errors. An 
alternative crude way of looking at the convergence is to analyze the annual changes in average 
                                                 
27 Due to missing data the share of fuel industry in industrial output had to be omitted. The Arellano-Bond estimator 
may be inconsistent in the presence of the second order autocorrelation in residuals. The null hypothesis of no second 
order autocorrelation cannot be rejected. 32 
standard errors in panel regressions from Table 4 and to look at R
2 measures of goodness of fit of 
year-specific cross-sectional regressions of fiscal decentralization on the same variables as in 
Table 4 (column A). Convergence is likely to result in declining mean standard error of the 
between panel residuals and in increasing R
2 measure of goodness of fit for individual cross-
sectional regressions. 
However Figure 2 demonstrates that there seems to be no clear increasing or decreasing 
pattern in the variance of residuals or R
2 coefficients.
28 the explanatory power of the chosen 
determinants of fiscal decentralization neither improves nor deteriorates over time, which also 
points toward the absence of fast convergence to an “equilibrium” degree of fiscal 
decentralization. 
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3.7. The flypaper effect revisited. Economists have long been puzzled by a so-called 
flypaper effect. Following a one dollar increase in regional income regional government spending 
normally increases by about 10 cents. However should an increase in regional income come in 
the form of intergovernmental transfer, between 50 and 100 cents of every dollar is spent by the 
                                                 
28 For visible comparability the graph shows the inverse of the mean standard error scaled down by the factor of 20 
(since better fit corresponds to higher R
2 and lower mean standard error). 33 
government. This phenomenon was called flypaper effect since the money appears to stick where 
it hits without being redistributed. Such pattern is clearly inconsistent with basic economic theory 
which suggests that the government maximizing social welfare should allocate available 
resources optimally between the public and private sectors regardless of the composition of 
regional income. And yet the flypaper effect is almost universal, having been documented almost 
in every country.
29  
Hines and Thaler (1995) discuss different explanations of this puzzling regularity. They 
show that misspecification of econometric models, confusion of average and marginal costs of 
local government spending projects, high political costs of attracting regional government 
revenue and other popular explanations advanced in the literature cannot account for the entire 
magnitude of the flypaper effect although they may have some explanatory power. Hines and 
Thaler then conclude that the flypaper effect must be a behavioral phenomenon of the “easy come 
easy go” type:  individuals and corporations find it easier to spend quickly unexpected “windfall 
revenues”, and so do governments.  
The analysis of fiscal decentralization in Russian regions provided an interesting indirect 
test of the hypothesis about the behavioral nature of the flypaper effect. Namely, if the theoretical 
argument of Hines and Thaler is valid, both windfall revenues of the richer regions (derived from 
natural resources) and those of the poorer regions (in the form of federal transfers) must be spent 
at the regional rather than municipal level (according to the “money sticks where it hits” 
principle), negatively affecting the extent of fiscal decentralization.  
The estimation shows that it is indeed the case (Table 4). Moreover, under additional 
assumptions calculations show that effects of windfall revenues in the form of transfers and 
natural resource rents are comparable: a 1% increase in the former results in between 0.11 and 
                                                 
29 Hines and Thaler survey the literature studying the flypaper effect mostly in the United States and Canada. 
However many studies found similar results for other countries. See, for instance, Sagbas and Saruc (2004) on 
Turkey, Lago-Peñas (2003) on Spain. 34 
0.22 percentage points higher centralization whereas a 1% increase in “excess” transfers leads on 
average to 0.19 percentage points additional centralization.
30 These qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar estimates support the hypothesis about the behavioral nature of the flypaper 
effect. 
IV. Conclusion 
The traditional positive theory of fiscal decentralization does rather a poor job of 
explaining the differences in the extent of fiscal decentralization across Russian regions. The 
coefficients on income and ethnolinguistic fractionalization in the standard base model were 
statistically significant, but of the strictly opposite sign relative to the priors. Democratization 
variables were insignificant (although, of course, the available proxies may not capture the 
concept of democratization particularly well). Within the standard decentralization model, only 
size and urbanization variables were significant and of expected sign. A more profound analysis 
points to the structure of regional government revenue as an important determinant of 
decentralization. Regional government revenues coming from the mineral resource sector and 
from federal transfers (i.e., “windfall” revenues) tend to be much less shared with municipal 
governments than more conventional regional revenues. Qualitatively and quantitatively similar 
effects of rent based and transfer based windfall revenues provided support for the behavioral 
explanation of the flypaper effect suggested by Hines and Thaler (1995): governments tend to 
spend “unearned” windfall revenues rather than share them with the lower tier of government or 
the population of the region in the same way as individuals and corporations find it easier to 
spend unexpected windfalls. 
                                                 
30 Assuming that a 1% increase in the share of oil and gas industry translates into an increase in windfall revenue 
equal to 1% of regional government revenue, its effect on the extent of fiscal decentralization is -0.22%. Assuming 
that oil and gas industry accounts for twice the average industry share in government revenue this effect drops to -
0.11%. In regions with excess transfer revenues the general regional government averages 0.29% GRP. Therefore the 
effect of an increase in windfall transfer revenue equal to 1% of the regional budget is on average -0.66%*0.29 = -
0.19%.  35 
Lower decentralization was also found to be associated with such development indicators 
as a higher share of university students in the regional population and lower infant mortality. 
When controlling for these additional factors, ethnolinguistic fractionalization lost its explanatory 
power, but regional size and urbanization variables retained their statistical significance and 
positive sign.  In addition, there was some evidence, albeit not very strong, that more keen 
regional reformers tended to have more decentralized governments compared to slow reformers. 
The paper also provides a new insight into the path dependence with respect to the degree 
of fiscal decentralization. Whereas Panizza (1999) produced an optimistic picture, according to 
which countries that are further away from the equilibrium level of decentralization converge to it 
faster, the present paper suggests that exogenous historical and cultural factors that determine a 
region’s attitude to reforms and to change in general can slow down such convergence regardless 
of the distance from the equilibrium. We found no evidence of convergence, albeit it should be 
noted that the rather short period of time considered cannot rule out the presence of long-term 
convergence. 
The findings of the paper are only partially consistent with the study of the determinants 
of fiscal decentralization in Russian regions by Freinkman and Yossifov (1999). While we also 
found that decentralization is positively associated with favorable attitude to reforms and is not 
affected by the area, Freinkman and Yossifov’s conclusion that more advanced regions tended to 
opt for higher fiscal decentralization was not confirmed.  
On the contrary, the results of the analysis question a widespread view that 
decentralization is a luxury good, whereby the demand for decentralization increases with income 
and the level of economic development. The analysis provides evidence (at least for a middle- 
income country such as Russia) of the higher demand for centralization at higher levels of income 
and development, possibly driven by two factors: increasing preferences for redistribution of 
wealth in the society and increasing propensity to finance large-scale publicly-funded 36 
development projects carried out at the government level above the municipality. Further analysis 
provided clear evidence only in favor of the latter explanation. However, it would be interesting 
to check if preferences for redistributive policies result in higher centralization in a cross-country 
context. 
It would also be interesting to test other main results of the paper in the cross-country 
context, especially the hypothesis that windfall revenues induce higher fiscal centralization. From 
the normative perspective, whether decentralization is beneficial for countries and regions, where 
a high share of government revenue is derived from the extraction of mineral resources, is an 
open question. The recent paper by Desai et al. (2003) provides evidence in favor of more 
centralized governance in such regions. The rationale is that rent-related government revenues 
depend very weakly, if at all, on the actions of subnational authorities, and thus higher 
decentralization does not improve incentives for high quality governance and revenue raising at 
the subnational level (whereas in the case of more conventional tax revenue, higher 
decentralization might encourage subnational governments to create better conditions for 
businesses and to improve revenue collection). However, if fiscal decentralization is viewed as 
broadly beneficial for development, additional policy measures may be needed to encourage a 
sufficient degree of fiscal decentralization in countries/regions with a high share of windfall 
revenues, which otherwise will be more inclined to stay over-centralized.  
These results also suggest that grants and loans provided to low and medium-income 
countries by international donors, which also may be viewed as windfall revenues by the 
recipients, are unlikely to reach the lower tiers of government and are likely to increase the extent 
of fiscal centralization. If this effect is to be avoided, a certain fraction of grants/loans must be 
clearly earmarked for subnational governments. 
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Appendix 1. Data Sources 
The data are taken from Rossiyskiy Statisticheskiy Ezhegodnik (Russian Statistical 
Yearbook [RSE]), Goskomstat, Moscow, 2003 and earlier years, with the following 
exceptions: 
Area, region-specific consumer price indices, social transfers, Gini coefficients for personal 
income, data on education: Regiony Rossii (Regions of Russia [RR], official statistical 
yearbook), Goskomstat, Moscow, 2002. Gini coefficients are constructed using data on 
the quintiles of income distribution. 
Corruption perception index: Transparency International and Transparency International 
Russia (available at http://www.transparency.org.ru) 
Electoral data for a broad sample of countries: World Bank Database of Political Indicators 
2000. 
Electoral data for Russian regions: Vybory glav ispolnitelnoy vlasti subyektov Rossiyskoy 
Federatsii. 1995-1997. Elektoralnaya statistika (1997), Moscow, Ves Mir (The 
elections of the governors of the regions of the Russian Federation. 1995-1997. 
Electoral statistics); Vybory v organy gosudarstvennoi vlasti subyektov Rossiskoy 
Federatsii. 1997-2000. Elektoralnaya statistika (2001), vol. 1-2, Moscow, Ves Mir 
(Regional authorities elections in the regions of the Russian Federation. 1997-2000. 
Electoral statistics); Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation (available 
at http://www.cikrf.ru). 
Fiscal data on regional and municipal budgets: Before 1999: Finansy v Rossii (Finance in 
Russia [FR], official statistical yearbook), Goskomstat, Moscow, 1996, 1998, 2000; 
World Bank staff. After 2000: Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, available 
at http://www.minfin.ru 
Gastil Index: Freedom House (available at http://www.freedomhouse.org) 
Gini coefficients for municipal government own revenue: Institute for Fiscal Policy, Moscow. 
Share of privatized enterprises in retail trade and services as of 1 July 1996, indices of price 
regulation, share of government subsidies in agricultural output: Lavrov (1996). 
Subsistence minimum: RSE, various years, and World Bank Staff estimates (for 2000).  
Tax collection: FR, various years, and the Ministry of Tax Collection (available at 
http://www.nalog.ru) 
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